 their agricultural products. Indeed, the measured effect of the Habsburg union on bilateral commerce was a three-fold increase (Flandreau and Maurel ) . Moreover, substantial productivity gains were achieved by Hungary between  and  in the agricultural sector (Schulze ) .
However, nobody has examined the monetary aspects of the Compromise so far, because nobody has looked at the Habsburg Empire as a monetary union. This is because of the deceptive nature of the Compromise: The Austro-Hungarian monetary union was not the result of a monetary marriage but the by-product of a fiscal divorce. Austria and Hungary became in  two sovereign budgetary entities. In the process, they retained a common bank of issue and thus formed a de facto monetary union that would operate until its post-World War I collapse (Nemec , Zeuceanu , and Garber and Spencer ) .
One consequence of this set-up was the development of a debate, not over union, but over the mirror image problem of secession. Of course, the reasons for not breaking free from a monetary union cannot be very different from the reasons for joining it. This observation is in effect at the heart of the modern political economy of the size of nations (see, for instance, Alesina and Spolaore ). Consider a monetary union comprising two parts, a 'large' (Austria) and a 'small' (Hungary) country. The common central bank delivers a range of services that are valuable to both parts, but not equally. The exact mix of services produced depends on the division of power. If power is proportional to size, the small country has very little control over common decisions. It is bound by the discipline of the union without being able to influence decision-making in a way that would address its own specific interests. Co-operation (that is, participation in the union) is sub-optimal and the small country prefers to quit. Sustained co-operation requires that the large country accepts a decision-making process in which the small country receives a greater voting share than size alone would predict.
Thus smaller 'nations' influence monetary unions disproportionately. However, it is not clear why the large country should accept this dilution of power. The normal outcome should therefore be secession: that is, a multiplication of political entities customised to meet the demands of heterogeneous groups of agents. Conditions to prevent this result include Olson and Zeckhauser's free rider problem where the large agent cannot really avoid free-riding by smaller members and prefers to commit them by giving them a greater controlling share (Olson and Zeckhauser ); and Kindleberger's benevolent 'hegemon' case where the large agent internalises the costs of anarchy (Kindleberger ) . More relevant to the issue of monetary unions however is the work of Casella () who shows that if co-operation delivers a number of public goods that are useful to all parts, then the large country may nonetheless accept a reduction of its relative ability to set decisions, since the additional output may compensate for the initial loss.
The current article uses this class of insights to analyse the economic logic of monetary bargaining in the Habsburg Empire, -.T h ev a n t a g e point it takes is that of the small country -Hungary -showing how secessionist threats succeeded in increasing its controlling share over the common central bank. The article proceeds as follows. Section  gives a narrative of Austro-Hungarian monetary negotiations between  and . It shows that Hungary consistently increased its formal control before reaching full parity with Austria. Section  focuses on the s when secession was seriously considered before being somewhat mysteriously discarded. Section  disposes of the view that fear of adverse consequences of secession on reputation is what deterred Hungary from breaking apart. Finally, Section  finds the explanation for the Hungarian turnabout in the policies of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, which began supporting Hungary over and beyond what statutes stipulated. The conclusion wraps up the argument and makes suggestions for future research.
. Monetary union as deal-making: -
The  'Compromise' delineated powers that were shared from those that weren't. Austria and Hungary would share a common market and trade policy, monetary standard, legal system, army, diplomacy, foreign representatives, and the Emperor of Austria would also be King of Hungary. On the other hand, each part would have its own parliament, government, and budget.
 Gerschenkron (, ) has emphasised the role of government spending in Central European development policies in the nineteenth century (see also Wysocki  and Brandt ) : In effect, a key concern of Hungarian elites when they requested fiscal sovereignty was to be able to finance infrastructure spending, such as the building of railways.
Money had not been discussed in detail. The Compromise only provided that the inconvertible notes of the Austrian National Bank, a private institution under government charter, would continue to be legal tender with the joint guarantee of the two parts. Moreover, through a separate agreement between the two governments (not ratified by parliaments: see Zuckerkandl ), Hungarians assumed the obligation not to allow any bank of issue to be created in their territory. This was acknowledging that the Austrian National Bank was the sole bank of issue of the whole monarchy.
 Hence while 'monetary union' between Austria and Hungary was not an explicit part of the Compromise, it was an implication. The dual monarchy was a de facto monetary union.
 The budgetary set up of the Habsburg monarchy can be called confederate. A common budget served to pay for the army and the foreign policy, but this 'federal' level had no authority over taxation. Its resources were, apart from the custom duties, transfers from the two countries' individual budgets. For details, see Flandreau () .  Agreement of  September : Zuckerkandl ().  However, in the nineteenth century, 'banks of issue' were seen as important instruments for nation-state building. They provided the national public good of a national market via homogenisation of the currency and contribution to financial integration (Helleiner  and ) . Controlling credit was also seen as a policy instrument for redistribution across regions and sectors. Finally, it was felt that ability to rediscount 'national' bills would encourage the 'national' economy and the creation of 'national banks' was supported by economic elites.

The Austrian National Bank was thus not long in seeking formal recognition from the Hungarian Diet. Hungary had conditions: an autonomous Direktion in Budapest (as opposed to the existing Subsidiary), with more resources. The bank refused (Kövér and Pogány ). Hungary's requests escalated as the  crash of the Vienna and Berlin stock exchanges led to widespread calls for bank support to depressed areas (Bailey ) . The expiration of the privileges of theÖNB at the end of  was also in sight. It conveniently happened to coincide with the renegotiation of the Compromise. Monetary bargaining involved the Austrian government, the Hungarian government and the shareholders of the Austrian National Bank. Experimenting with a technique that would be used repeatedly, the Magyars threatened to set up a National Bank of Hungary. On the other hand, shareholders were worried about granting control to a 'foreign' authority (shareholders were mostly citizens of Austria). The Austrian government was concerned among other things with preserving the political unity of the monarchy. In the end, on  July , the Bank became the AustroHungarian Bank (Österreichisch-ungarische Bank in German -Osztrák-magyar bank in Hungarian).
By this act, the new bank (which inherited the balance sheet of its predecessor) became a 'federal' institution. It had two main 'Managements' (Hauptanstalten) in Vienna and Budapest respectively, run by a 'Managing Board' (Direktion) and a central office in Vienna, headed by the General Council (Generalrath), the executive body of the bank in charge of setting the discount rate. The sophisticated design of the Bank's organisational chart is a suggestion of the intricacy of the discussions involved (see Noël , Conant , and Zuckerkandl  for details). The Governor was to be appointed by the Emperor and King upon joint nomination of the Austrian and Hungarian finance ministers. He was to be seconded by two ViceGovernors, one Hungarian and one Austrian, appointed by their respective governments from a list submitted by the shareholders. There were also twelve Councillors: at least two had to be Austrian and two Hungarian, and the rest were appointed at the will of the assembly of shareholders. The  Hungary was a case in point. During the  uprising, the emergency Magyar government had given the exclusive right of issue to a Hungarian Commercial Bank in which Kossuth, hero of the Revolution, played a major role (see Lévy a, p.  and b).
Governor, the Vice-Governors and the Councillors formed the General Council. The Managing Boards were presided over by the Vice-Governors of the respective nationalities. The two governments were entitled to a share of the profits.  Finally, the new charter had a short duration of ten years, against  years for earlier ones.
 This was obviously the Compromise's signature. Austro-Hungarian arrangements were renewed without substantial change or resistance in .
 However, during the s, the decision to stabilise the paper florin onto a gold parity (called the crown and worth . florins at the current exchange rate) reopened difficult issues. The reform envisioned the transfer of all monetary prerogatives from the fiscal authorities (national governments) to the Bank (Flandreau ). Specifically, governments had to repurchase early issues of state notes and discontinue silver coinage for their own account. Since new issues of state notes had been ruled out in  and silver coinage was marginal, there was no loss of monetary control. But the repurchase of government paper was costly. The Austrian government used this as an excuse to claim some form of control, and it was supported by Hungary who was not so sure it should contribute to repurchase preCompromise paper issues. According to external observers 'the general opinion is that there ought to be substantial restrictions on the autonomy of the Bank'.
 The Bank insisted that the credibility of the currency would gain from this so that no further compensation was needed.
 It also wanted a longer duration of its charter to be protected from the political hazards of periodic compromise rounds.
Hungary floated its now routine secessionist threat. Premier Wekerle suggested creating two separate banks of issue.
 The fall of the Hungarian cabinet removed part of the urgency, facilitating monetary stabilisation.

Despite no agreement being reached, the Bank nonetheless began pegging the florin exchange rate within gold points, a scheme that would last until World War I (Flandreau and Komlos ) . But Hungarians insisted that they wanted full parity within the common bank, and made it an absolute  Austria was entitled to  per cent and Hungary to  per cent of the portion of dividends that was not distributed to shareholders.  Such short charters were rare by European standards : see Flandreau et al. () condition for their continued co-operation. After two more years of muddling through they eventually got their way.  The new Charter, granted by the law of  September , was valid until  (that is, slightly beyond the date when the next Compromise was to be renegotiated, in ). It formally acknowledged that each nation retained the right to set up its own bank. Monetary sovereignty was thus a political prerogative, and the common central bank, an alienation of that right. Moreover, statutes resulted in establishing full parity. The influence of shareholders over appointments was reduced to drawing up a list of eligible candidates, which Hungary and Austria formally designated. The autonomy of each regional direction was enhanced (Michel ,p.) . It was further decided that the shareholders assembly would meet in either Vienna or Budapest depending on the majority's country of residence.
 Profits accruing to the two governments became a function of where bank income originated. Finally, the influence of the two national commissaries was increased beyond their former purely consultative vote.
 After , they had a veto right, motivated by exceptional circumstances ('raison d'état' ).

There was thus a definite trend in Hungary's formal influence within the common Bank. This trend was also reflected in substantive policies of the Bank, such as the coverage of the Magyar territory by subsidiaries. As Figure  shows, the Austro-Hungarian National Bank transformed itself from being a predominantly Austrian institution in  into being a truly binational institution. There were only five Hungarian branches out of  in  ( per cent), but  out of  in  ( per cent), and  out of  in  ( per cent). One sure criterion by which to assess the achievements of Hungary is to compare its 'share of the cake' with economic size: with about  per cent of the dual monarchy's population, Hungary controlled  per cent of the decision-making process. And with about  per cent of the Habsburg GDP, it hosted  per cent of the Bank's branches. Therefore, Hungary had a more than proportional influence. Moreover, we saw that this had been secured by threatening to set up its own bank. In light of the theoretical elements discussed in the introduction, the implication must be that Hungarians would have been able to secure better terms for themselves had they actually quit the union than the ones they would have faced if those favourable adjustments had not taken place. And of course, it must also be the case that both Austria and the Austro-Hungarian Bank found the deal palatable -the alternative being that they had no choice.
. The independent Hungarian Bank: rise and fall
On January , , a coalition led by the Independence Party, or 'Party of ', defeated the incumbent Liberal Party. The Independence Party was headed by Ferencz Kossuth, son of the  hero. Despite the Emperor and King's animadversions, Kossuth was received in Vienna in late February. His party's claims were a separate army, diplomacy, trade policy, and custom duties inside the union. They could not be readily implemented, because they did not represent the coalition's consensus.  However, former supporters of the Liberal Party, led by Wekerle, set up their own 'Dissidents' group, and leant towards Kossuth. On  April , a Wekerle cabinet was created, in which Kossuth participated. At this point, monetary secession, the only kind  For a chronicle of the episode, see The Economist,  February, p. ,  February, p. -, .
of separation that was feasible without Vienna's formal agreement, became the focus of nationalists.

In the Spring of , separatists began a campaign against the Austro-Hungarian Bank, criticising 'overly restrictive' monetary policies, 'unsuitable' to Transleithania.
 Attacks on the monetary union were taken seriously: special arrangements to decide on a unit of account in the event of secession were considered. Austrian banks such as the Boden Creditanstalt took steps to make sure credits would always be paid back in Austrian money.
 The Compromise of  did contain provisions for the liquidation of crown debts.
 The fate of the bank remained pending. On  December , a worried General Assembly of shareholders requested from the Imperial and Royal governments a renewal of the charter before its scheduled expiration date of December .

By that time, however, it had become clear that secession had stirred much debate within Hungary. In March , the Wekerle government set up a special parliamentary committee, the 'Hollo Commission',  to examine the technicalities of separation from Austria. A questionnaire was sent out to leading economists.
 Hearings turned out to be a forum of dissenting opinions (Michel ) . Despite the exiguity of Hungary's ruling classes, two opposed views emerged.
 On the one hand was Budapest, where bankers feared that monetary secession would make it difficult to tap the Vienna money market. The Hungarian land-owning gentry, who lived in Budapest and were Count Tisza's Liberal Party's base, also shared this position. It feared that dissolution of the monetary union would herald the collapse of the custom union. Austria might then increase tariffs on corn and force Hungarian producers to compete against Russia for their  External observers saw monetary secession as a consequence of the Kossuth program.
Conant, for instance, describes it as 'one of the projects which grew logically out of the movement which gained momentum at the beginning of the twentieth century for the restoration of Hungarian independence' (Conant ,p .).  Similar attacks on 'too high' interest rates had been repeatedly heard in the past, but this time they were crystallising. Michel (,p .- market. An Austrian observer argued: 'One thing is certain: just as it is absolutely necessary to have a common currency and a common bank for a common trade area, it is impossible to keep together a common trade area without a common bank and a common currency. The leaders of the Independence Party seem to believe that it is politically easier to obtain a monetary separation than a division of the trade area, and consequently tenaciously pursue their goal of a separate bank, in the hope that the customs union will collapse by itself as a result' (Federn ,p .-).
On the other hand the pro-secession group comprised 'provincial' interests. These included chiefly the Chambers of Commerce representing industrialists and regional bankers. The industrialists discarded the risk of exchange depreciation, which at worst would boost their competitiveness (Michel ,p .). They were also prepared for custom duties within the monarchy, since this meant protection against Austria's industry. They also wanted cheap credit and believed that a national bank would be successful at meeting their specific needs. Regional bankers concurred, complaining that the Austro-Hungarian Bank was not paying enough attention. They claimed they were victims of discrimination and credit rationing. The contrast between bankers' views in Budapest and the provinces is really intriguing. How could Budapest and the Provinces differ so much?
As divisions became apparent in , two evolutions took place. First, regional interests, and especially bankers, began adopting more unionfriendly tones. The chasm between financiers in Budapest and the regions was being bridged over. In February , a congress of provincial bankers acknowledged that access to the common bank's discounting facilities was quite useful. The conference concluded with a declaration reflecting the turnabout: 'This century is not devoted to disruption but to intense and pervasive exchanges, to mutual understanding, to reasonable compromises. Agreeing on the basis that is necessary to the satisfaction of all parts involved is in no way a lack of patriotism.'  Second, evidence that a fraction of the public wanted to retain some benefits of a common central bank led Wekerle to produce an alternative secession scheme. It combined full separation between the two parts of the Austro-Hungarian Bank along with a cartel agreement between the two resulting entities. The 'Central Bank Cartel' would impose a uniform interest rate throughout both countries, and a fixed exchange rate between each part. That would still be a monetary union, but the centralisation of decisionmaking would be restricted to a minimum. From what we can understand, it seems that the scheme envisioned reciprocal par acceptance of the notes issued by each bank. The free-rider problem was obvious, and resulted in depriving Austria of control over the money supply. Agents would have obtained credit where it was cheapest (in Hungary), and monetary policy  Quoted in Neue Freie Presse,  February .
would have been set in Budapest. The Austrian reaction was 'quick and violent'.
 It could not prevent Hungary from setting up its own bank, but it could refuse cooperation with that scheme.
 On  April , the Emperor Franz-Josef vetoed the Cartel on the ground that it endangered the solidity and credit of the Austro-Hungarian bank of issue.
By the Autumn of , the Independence Party was disintegrating: extremists led by Justh insisted on the strict application of the initial project of a fully sovereign Hungarian National Bank. But a more moderate faction, led by Kossuth and Count Apponyi, resisted. The Wekerle Cabinet fell in January .
 Hungary began to negotiate a renewal of the AustroHungarian Bank's charter for another ten years. In the Spring of  anew election sealed the fate of the Independence Party.
 An arrangement was arrived at with the Bank before the former statutes expired. The charter of October  extended the life of the common bank for another round in essentially the same shape as in . The independent central bank project had collapsed, apparently of Hungary's own accord. In , the Hungarian finance minister Teleszky would declare: 'The common bank is a better deal for us than an independent bank of issue would have been'.
 What had changed between  and  that made secession so much less attractive? 
. Reputation and secession
Supporters of secession vituperated that the change of mind had resulted from their adversaries' skilful propaganda. They accused them of having threatened the 'less knowledgeable categories of national production' with apocalyptic and of course unfounded predictions such as a 'constant, ruinous increase of the discount rate'.  Given the elitist nature of the debate, it is not clear that such accusations were warranted. One does find evidence of sophisticated contemporary discussions of the economics of secession, as illustrated for instance by two survey articles published in .Thefirst,by Federn, editor of theÖsterreichische Volkswirt, supported the continuation of monetary union. The second, by one Aberdam, popularised the views of Béla Földés (a Professor of Political Economy at the University of Budapest and expert for the Hungarian monetary commission of ), who supported secession.
 Taken together, the two articles provide a comprehensive review of the arguments.
Protagonists concurred that assessing properly the costs of secession hinged critically on measuring the cost of capital with and without monetary union. Thanks to the pioneering work of economist Frigyes Fellner on Hungary's balance of payment (Fellner , , ), contemporaries were aware of Hungary's dependence on foreign capital.
 Hungarian government bonds were largely held in Austria, even if this fraction was declining in the early s, owing to purchases by Hungarians investors ( Figure ) . Moreover, scattered evidence pointed to a substantial reliance of Hungary on short-term capital from Vienna.
 Overdrafts and deposits from Viennese banks helped finance credit expansion in Hungary.

Opponents of secession emphasised that the lack of a common currency might complicate Hungary's management of its external books. For instance, Viennese banks would not be as willing to supply money to their Hungarian counterparts as they had been previously. Difficulties could also arise if Austrians were to dump Hungarian securities on the market. Federn argued that 'Austria removes the problem of stabilization of the currency from Hungary, and that is probably the greatest service which Austria gives to the Hungarians, through the banking and monetary community'.
 Finally there would be exchange rate fluctuations, which, albeit small (they would Source: Fellner, . The figures were derived from information on where the coupon on Hungary's 'special debt' was paid. This does not include the part of the pre- 'common debt' for which an annuity was paid to Austria.
occur within 'gold points' since it was generally agreed that a sovereign Hungary would be on gold) would require the National Bank of Hungary to raise interest rates when needed. But would the new Bank of Hungary enjoy the experience and credibility of the Austro-Hungarian Bank?  Secession might have perverse effects given its intended objective of a greater supply of credit.
Secessionists conceded that over the short run there might be some costs, due to the inevitable 'jolts of transition, lack of experience and age-old traditions on behalf of the new Bank, and exchange rate fluctuations'.

But the process would generate self-stabilising forces in a 'neo-classical' fashion: with Austrian sales of Hungarian securities, yields would rise, but this would encourage foreigners to increase their holdings of Hungarian bonds, restoring equilibrium. To the notion that an adverse balance of payments meant losing gold and forced discount rate increases, secessionists objected using an early variant of the monetary approach to the balance  The new Bank, warned Federn, 'would have to take care that its notes get a stable price in foreign exchanges, if it wanted to prevent damaging its reputation', Federn (, p. ).  Aberdam (,p .).
of payments (Frenkel and Johnson ) .
 International gold flows were determined by national monetary requirements, not by the current account. The international monetary equilibrium produced a 'smooth distribution of gold between the various countries, according to each nation's needs'.

If gold leaked out in excess of needs, interest rates might rise but only transitorily, and this would check the export of gold thus ruling out the supposed need for continued interest rate hikes (this is similar to McCloskey and Zecher ). After all, other debtor countries were able to retain their gold reserves.
Thus, secessionists disregarded the transition to the post-separation equilibrium as a problem of secondary importance. Perfect international arbitrage (the 'resources of modern finance' and the 'speed of communications' in the language of the time) would ensure that monetary equilibrium be obtained at low cost. Some institutional details could determine the cyclical behaviour of interest rates.
 But a carefully designed exit strategy would prevent interest rates from rising.
 If a given security is indeed a low risk, someone will inevitably end up holding it at the right price: the question thus boiled down to a matter of 'credit standing'.
 Secession only required 'foreign confidence, on which in the last analysis all economic relations rest. As long as Hungary knows how to retain that trust, its transactions will not encounter, on the international money market, any serious difficulty.' emphasising that the ultimate determinant of interest rates was marginal productivity of capital, which was bound to equalise across the world. Aberdam explicitly quotes the work of the Italian economist (and later politician) Francesco Saverio Nitti, who had demonstrated in  that 'in the ideal case of a pure credit economy, the maximum interest rate is given by the average profit rate'. It seems that Aberdam was referring to La misura delle variazioni di valore della moneta,quotedbyFisher().  Such was the conventional view among contemporaries. As James de Rothschild had reminded the Austrian minister of finance a few months after the first Compromise was signed 'the price of public securities is, with good reasons, considered as the exact measure of the degree of trust which national credit deserves. It is on that basis that the credit of all national companies is in turn assessed, and, from that point of view it has a tremendous influence on the development of prosperity'. Quoted in Gille ().  Aberdam (,p .).
On this account, secessionists emphasised that the Magyar government had 'never abused its creditors, never reneged on its commitments'  . Who was right? This paragraph focuses on one aspect of the debate, namely the effect of secession on bond prices. In , Hungary's public debts comprised two parts: on the one hand were Hungary's 'domestic' paper bonds, denominated in crowns. On the other hand were the 'gold' bonds, denominated in Western European gold convertible currencies. The concern opponents to secession had was that paper bonds, denominated in the union's currency, were 'at home' both in Vienna and Budapest, and in effect largely held in Vienna. Haupt () indicated that around ,  per cent of Hungary's paper debts were held in Hungary,  per cent in Vienna and only  per cent abroad.
 But this situation would only continue for as long as Hungary remained within the monetary union. In the event of monetary secession, and even if debts were denominated in Austrian currency as they normally would have been (redenomination in Hungarian currency being equivalent to a default since it had not been considered in initial contracts), Austrians might have become much less eager to hold such bonds. As for investors outside the Habsburg Empire -in Berlin, Paris, or London -they might not have been willing to make up the difference and buy what Austria might be selling. This, not so much because of distrust, but rather because of the transaction costs they faced when cashing their coupons or performing arbitrage operations. The market for crowns in, say, Berlin, was less liquid than the market for, say, sterling, explaining why such a modest fraction of Hungary's crown paper debts ( per cent in )w as held outside the dual monarchy. Therefore, the argument would go, the bulk of Hungary's crown debts would have inevitably fallen back into Hungarian hands, causing a deterioration in borrowing conditions. But this problem could be taken care of via financial innovation. One only had to combine secession with a conversion of the crown debts into gold debts. Indeed this was the standard purpose of including foreign exchange clauses in debt contracts -to secure a liquid market abroad (Flandreau and Sussman  international instrument (Michel ). As they discovered, the size of the required conversion would be manageable. Standing at  per cent of Hungary's so-called 'special debts' in , paper debts declined to  per cent in  and  per cent in .

Thus the whole issue boils down to measuring the impact of secession on the yield on gold-denominated government securities. While this cannot be measured directly, it is possible to address a tightly related question. We can determine whether Hungary benefited from better borrowing conditions as a result of her being part of the Habsburg Empire. In Flandreau and Zumer (), we used contemporary data to price gold bonds yields for an almost comprehensive list of European nations (plus Argentina and Brazil) in the late nineteenth century (-). The study found that debt burdens, measured as the ratio of debt service to government revenues, accounted for most of the cross-sectional and time series variations of long term interest rates. Because the sample precisely contains sovereign countries of varied size, location, and reputation, it provides an estimate of the average elasticity of borrowing terms to the debt burden for a sovereign nation, and can thus serve to simulate what would have been Hungary's borrowing costs, had it been sovereign.
If being part of the Habsburg Monarchy improved Hungary's borrowing prospects, then we should find that Hungary faced lower rates than those implied by its 'fundamentals', using the general formula that applies to sovereigns.
 Figure  provides a visual test of the value of being part of the Habsburg Empire. It depicts the actual spread between Hungarian and Austrian yields, the simulated one (obtained using the general formula for sovereign countries), and confidence margins. If Hungary benefited from union, we should expect the simulated spread to be significantly above the observed one. But the actual and simulated spreads are very close to one another, and discrepancies are neither large (at most  basis points) nor significant.
 One can reject the hypothesis that membership of the Habsburg monarchy entailed credibility gains. Hungary was essentially priced as a sovereign nation.
 One interpretation, of course, is that Habsburg membership was never taken very seriously by the market, given all the secessionist threats, so that investors had already priced Hungary as a  Author's computations, from Crédit lyonnais Archives. Figures refer to the fraction of post- debts. I have included the crown debts of the s on the understanding that these included fixed exchange rate clauses.  For details, see Flandreau and Zumer (,p .- and -).  Interestingly, the  election might have played a role in marginally deteriorating borrowing conditions, but the effect remains very modest.  Contrast with the discussion in Eddie () who argues that Franz-Joseph would never have accepted that Hungary would default. That Hungarian rates were on average above Austrian rates is evidence that investors disagreed. And this is the only thing that matters when measuring the costs of secession. sovereign country; in which case we may understand why secession could not have affected borrowing costs. Strictly speaking, this finding says nothing about what would have actually happened in the event of secession. Hungarians authorities might of course have become crazy, they might have printed money, issued debt, defaulted, and so on. Or they might have been able to cut military spending, improve their fiscal capacity by raising custom duties, and similar measures. All these moves would have influenced yields in one way or another, so that a 'complete' counterfactual is just not feasible. The point, however, is that they might have followed just the same policies as they actually did, and wouldn't have behaved worse than any other sovereign nation of the time. But that's all we need to prove: that in this case the market would not have penalised Hungary. In sum, we should not look in the bond market for participation incentives, for they were just not there.
. 'A better deal for us': the Austro-Hungarian Bank and the Compromise
So why didn't Hungary secede? This article's interpretation of why monetary union turned out to be a better deal for Hungary rests on two complementary arguments, having to do with national and international monetary integration respectively. Consider international monetary integration first.
The previous section has shown that the credibility costs of secession were probably inessential since financial innovation could secure a replacement for Vienna as supplier of capital. Not all costs could be escaped, however. In a sovereign Hungary, private credit, in the form of bill discounting, would be conducted at higher costs than if the Magyars remained part of the Empire. This is because, as long as they were part of the Empire, Hungarian borrowers could draw crown-denominated bills of exchange on Viennese correspondents. These bills could then be sold anywhere in the world where Viennese financiers had connections. Flandreau and Jobst ()s h o w that the Austro-Hungarian currency was traded in a very large number of centres. It was bought and sold in virtually every European market and in a few non-European markets such as Mexico. Its international standing was comparable to that of the Dutch florin or Belgian franc, two important European currencies. Moreover, Flandreau and Jobst () report evidence of a tight correlation between international circulation (measured by the number of markets where a given currency was traded) and short-term commercial rates. At a time when fixed exchange rates ruled, persistent interest differentials must be interpreted as liquidity premiums. Figure  illustrates this relation for . As can be seen, currencies traded in the smallest number of foreign markets had short-term interest rates at least  basis points above London rates (and possibly much more since it is quite likely that the true relation was non-linear). The currency of the Habsburg monarchy, which enjoyed regional circulation, had rates on average only about  basis points above London. Against this background, a reasonable guess on the rates that would have prevailed in an independent Hungary can be inferred. Roughly speaking, Hungary would not be very unlike Romania, or roughly  basis points above London. A more rigorous measure is to use empirical data to predict the number of markets where the Hungarian currency would have been traded.
 The answer one gets is that it would have been traded in one foreign market at most -Vienna. Using the regression line in Figure  , we may conclude that Hungarian short term spreads against British rates would have stood at about  basis points above what they were when Hungary was part of the dual monarchy. This is one measure of the cost of secession, and it is substantial.
An independent Hungary would thus have had a higher discount rate than if it had remained part of the Habsburg union. This helps in understanding the commitment of Budapest bankers to monetary union, discussed earlier,  The procedure is to use the estimated parameters of the determinants of foreign quotation considered in Flandreau and Jobst () , and then simulate the number of expected quotations on the basis of data for Hungary. For simplicity, it is assumed that Hungarian trade patterns are constant post-secession. Given the pre-secession concentration of Hungarian trade this provides an upper bound to the likely number of quotations. and their concerns that secession would mean a higher price for working capital. But how to understand then that Hungarians could be so bold and so successful when threatening secession? And how could regional bankers fail to understand this? To explain this paradox, we must take into account the existence of very poor regional monetary integration of Hungarian provinces with the rest of the monarchy, including Budapest. While precise data on this are lacking, anecdotal evidence suggests that Hungary's provinces had substantially higher interest rates than the rest of the monarchy.
 Moreover, a parallel may be drawn with the findings of David Good for Austria (Good a, b) . Good reports evidence of higher interest rates in Austria's provinces than in Vienna during the period -,a n ds h o w st h a t these differentials declined in proportion to the decrease in transaction costs  According to Michel (), p. , the Austrian Vice-Governor argued during the Generalrath meeting of  June  that the current bank rate was 'certainly too low' given Hungary's systematic tendency to have higher rates. and the greater circulation of capital across regions.  Most critically, Good specifically acknowledged the importance of the central bank in fostering market integration in Austria. In any case, all evidence we have on the relative development of the two parts of the monarchy, both economic and financial, points to Hungarian retardation and a worse situation in its provinces.
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Therefore, there was gap between the credit conditions in Hungarian regions and those in Budapest. For the Provinces, the benefits of being tied to an international currency could be offset by local inefficiencies. A better course of action was thus to set up an independent bank in Budapest. This would create higher benchmark rates in Budapest, but could also help to push down local rates.
A simple model of credit markets can help clarify the intuition (Figures a  to c) . We consider the situation around . Bankers in Budapest can rediscount bills at the Austro-Hungarian Bank's rate. Interest rates in Budapest are thus equal to interest rates in Vienna. Hungarian Provinces are isolated by large transaction costs and face high rates. Figure bs h Figure c , is that there should be a massive transfer of credit to Hungarian Provinces. Figure  shows what happened to the Austro-Hungarian Bank's portfolio of commercial bills after the victory of the Independence Party in . Four items are identified: 'Vienna', 'Budapest', 'Austrian branches' and 'Hungarian branches'. Between , when the campaign against the bank began, and , when Teleszky pronounced the common bank 'a better deal', the share of the Hungarian branches' discounts increased from being the lowest to being the highest. This is exactly the prediction in Figure c . A better deal indeed: Hungary's second thoughts may be easier to understand now.
Further evidence can be obtained by looking at Figure , 1888  1889  1890  1891  1892  1893  1894  1895  1896  1897  1898  1899  1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 Maturity close to two months throughout the entire period under study. It was by contrast much lower in Budapest and in Austrian provinces, and even lower in Vienna ( days). This shows that, while the Bank acted in Vienna more like a 'modern' central bank, rediscounting bills from bankers, it behaved in Hungarian provinces as a primary discount house, probably supplying funds to merchants, industrialists and certainly local financiers. Combining this with the evidence of an increase in overall lending, we must conclude that the Austro-Hungarian Bank became after  a powerful engine of regional market integration in Hungary. These elements point to a simple interpretation of the failure of the Hungarian National Bank project. The reason why secessionists lost the support of the provincial elites is because the Bank bought in this group. The generous share of the total credit supply of the Bank that the Hungarian provinces received aligned their incentives with their Budapest counterparts. By standing ready to give credit in Hungarian Provinces at conditions close to those in Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian Bank provided a net benefit that would be lost in the event of secession. This is what stabilised the bargaining relation within the monarchy. Historian Bernard Michel once suggested: 'Financial links between Vienna and Budapest were one of the strongest foundations of the continuation of the Compromise' (Michel ,p .). This article has provided some elements on why and how this was the case.
Conclusions
This article has argued that the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of  should be studied as a bargain in which monetary interests loomed large. But if the compromise was a 'deal' then the natural instruments of investigation should be the tools of public economics and political economy. We found that the survival of the monetary union between Austria and Hungary really resulted from an adjustment of incentives. Hungary had been able to secure formal control over the common central bank. Moreover after  it was also able to secure an increasing share of Austro-Hungarian Bank lending. This evolution makes perfect sense in the light of the theoretical elements put forward in the Introduction. Because the Magyars had pretty definite ideas about what their development strategy should look like, and because they were prepared to discontinue their membership of monetary union if they did not have their way, their negotiating counterparts had to give in, or face the prospect of secession.
What remains to be fully understood, therefore, are the motives for Austria and the Austro-Hungarian Bank shareholders' behaviour. Future research should explore this matter systematically, but a few leads seem obvious. For Austria, candidate explanations include security, dynastic and imperial considerations. Economic factors might have played a role as well: for instance, one such is the maintenance of the crown as an international currency. It is likely, and in effect, consistent with the evidence in Flandreau and Jobst () , that the size of the dual monarchy was a critical factor in explaining the international success of its currency: Austria might have suffered from becoming smaller as a result of Hungary's secession. An additional important item was the impact of the monetary union on bilateral trade. There again, Austria would have lost from secession. Another promising research avenue is to explore the co-operation incentives of the Austro-Hungarian Bank. However it may have been willing to extend its business in Hungary for purely political motives: because Austria wanted it and because the Bank could not afford to upset the master. On the other hand, increasing its activity in Hungary might have turned out to be a lucrative job. Before more work is done, we can conservatively remark that we do not know that the Bank became less profitable after it extended its activity in Hungary. Keeping Austria and Hungary together might have been a rewarding business. The conclusion would be that central banks are powerful political/bureaucratic actors in monetary unions. Because they may benefit from expanding their size, they are concerned with supporting the union and thus tend to transform themselves, over time, into a tool for redistribution.
To conclude, we should note that the evidence on the monetary aspects of the Habsburg union reported here reinforces earlier suggestions (Komlos b) that the Habsburg union was a good deal for Hungary, in blatant contrast with the conventional views on the matter. Recast in terms of the classic debate on 'centrifugal' vs. 'centripetal' forces in the pre-World War I Austro-Hungarian monarchy, this article's main finding is that strong cooperative forces were at work in the period under study, as evidenced by the ability to strike a series of monetary deals and by the failure of the secessionist project. The eventual break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was by no means 'written on the wall'.
Data appendix
Several series used in the article were collected and constructed from archival or scattered sources, and are provided for reference. The specific financial organisation of the Habsburg monarchy identified, aside from each country's 'special budget', a 'common budget' that was essentially a transfer system, bound to be in equilibrium each year. This required a number of transformations of the primary data in order to identify proper 'Austrian' and 'Hungarian' accounts. First, gross interest service numbers needed to be corrected since Austria assumed the service of pre- debts, but received an annual contribution from Hungary. Hungary's contribution to Austria needed to be added to Hungary's official interest service but subtracted from Austria's. Revenues were constructed using the rule that defined the breakdown of 'common resources' (the income from customs). The yields are the return on Austrian and Hungarian % Gold Bonds in Paris, from Le Rentier. Using other markets (such as London, Berlin or Vienna) to compute yields gives identical results. Population is from Crédit lyonnais archives. Table A . contains data on Austro-Hungarian Bank's (AHB) holdings of commercial bills (discounts) at the end of each year. The source is the official reports of the Austro-Hungarian Bank. Table A . gives the average maturity of commercial bills held by the AustroHungarian bank, depending on where these bills were discounted (this definition should not be mixed up with a breakdown of bills according to where they are payable. Since it often happened that bills discounted in Austria originated in Hungary, while the opposite was much less frequent (owing to the importance of the Austrian banking system at large for Hungary), the numbers reported here and in the text underestimate the extent of the actual support of the AHB to Hungary. This, of course, only strengthens our point.
